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The Lost Cause Mythology contains great “What i f ..."  questions; of these, one of 
the greatest is what would have happened if General Thomas (Stonewall) J. Jackson had 
not been killed so early on in the Civil War. Jackson was a disciplined and aggressive 
commander but as with all mythology, the facts have been exaggerated. Three 
discrepancies exist that portray Jackson as a good general but not the iconic figure found 
in most historical accounts. Jackson’s tendency towards secrecy prevented him from 
sharing his plans and intentions with subordinates, fellow commanders, and superiors.
His stubborn nature was problematic, and resulted in a constant stream of courts-martial, 
which he was almost too willing to use against other officers, as well as in general 
discord, even amongst his most senior officers. He has been deemed a military genius, 
but he was only a genius as compared to the Union commanders that he faced in battle.
General Jackson’s secrecy was well known and resulted in many problems 
throughout his military campaigning in the Civil War. It affected the morale of his 
troops, hampered relations and caused confusion with both his own generals and other 
commanding generals, and resulted in the confusion that led to his death. Many 
commanders throughout military history have been secretive without negatively affecting 
their troops. Jackson believed in strict discipline and always providing optimal 
performance; consequently, he pushed his men like he pushed himself, no matter the 
conditions or how tired he was. At a time when only the officers and cavalry did not 
walk, the strain of his pushing took a horrible toll on the morale of his troops. This 
constant strain, combined with his decision to continue the Valley Campaign during the 
winter months, resulted in a severe drop in the spirits of his men. They spent most of 
their time struggling to go to an unknown destination and even the officers began to 
complain. Jackson’s brigade commander, General Charles Winder, after being ordered to 
complete another forced march said “he might as well lose his men in battle as on such a 
march.” 1 The actions of one of Jackson’s generals, Loring, provide strong evidence of 
the reaction of the men and officers to the secrecy.
1 James I. Robertson, The Stonewall Brigade (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1977), 102.
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The affair began when Jackson left Loring and his men to defend the city of 
Romney during the winter months of the Valley Campaign. The men and their general 
felt they had been left in an indefensible position with few supplies while Jackson retired 
to the comfortable lodgings of Winchester. Loring, with the full support of both his 
officers and enlisted men wrote to the War Department (in Richmond) in complaint. As a 
result of Loring’s political connections and strong convictions shown in the request, he 
was “ordered.. .to evacuate Romney and return with his command to the vicinity of 
Winchester.”2 This order was sent “without consultation with General Jackson” and “in 
direct opposition” to his known plans.3 The bypassing of Jackson and the resulting break 
in the chain-of-command was a considerable insult and it was only with a threat of 
resignation that he reasserted his authority and regained the respect that he had lost.
The men always forgave their commander after these affairs because of his record 
of success. Even so, during moments of crisis Jackson could face passive resistance (ex. 
orders ignored) and occasionally the real possibility of mutiny. This concept is 
summarized well by one of Jackson’s commanders, A. P. Hill, who wrote of Jackson, 
“The Almighty will get tired, helping Jackson after awhile, and then he’ll get the damdest 
thrashing—and the shoe pinches, for 1 should get my share and probably all the blame, 
for the people will never blame Stonewall for any disaster.”4
Jackson’s secrecy often caused problems with both his own commanders and 
other commanders. The problem arose from two factors. The first was that the lack of 
knowledge caused frustration and confusion while the second was the aristocratic 
background and nature o f the commanders. Jackson was not an aristocrat and was prone 
to be stubborn and speak bluntly. He was unable to understand the need for tact and 
diplomacy in dealing with men who had been raised to believe that they were superior to 
the common man and were used to getting what they wanted. This inability manifested 
itself during the Battle of McDowell in 1862 and involved Jackson’s commander, Major 
Harman. Harman was charged with strategically moving supplies and after having to 
work with Jackson’s secrecy, he complained that “Jackson’s mysterious ways are 
unbearable.”5 His constant request for information resulted in an insulting rebuff by 
Jackson and Harman then “thanked him for his candor and told him [he] would resign.”6
When working with other commanders, Jackson had a tendency to operate 
independently. He always accepted the authority and orders of the Confederate War 
Department but he was prone to interpret them loosely. An example of this can be found 
in the early days of the war when he was instructed to patrol along the Virginia-Maryland 
border near the point where the Potomac River, Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and the 
Shenandoah Rivers intersect. He took it upon himself to cross the border and take the 
Maryland Heights and only after doing so informed Lee.7
In addition to causing problems amongst his men and other commanders,
Jackson’s secrecy ultimately cost him his life when he was shot by friendly fire (by the
2 Henry K. Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1940), 25.
3 Ibid.
4 Byron Farwell, Stonewall: A Biography o f General Thomas J. Jackson (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1992), 457.
5 Ibid., 265
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 160.
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18lh North Carolina Infantry Regiment) at night during the battle of Chancellorsville. 
After situating his men, he had left the Confederate line to get reconnaissance on the 
terrain with several of his staff (about twenty men). He did not inform any of his lower 
level commanders about his mission and when returning he approached the lines 
recklessly. A captain of the regiment, Alfred Tolar, fired, later stating that “the tramp of 
thirty horsemen advancing through a heavy forest at a rapid gait seemed to the average 
infantryman like a brigade of cavalry.” The failure to recognize Jackson was further 
hampered by the constant harassment of the picket lines by Union cavalry; thus not only 
did the entourage sound like the enemy, but the lines were expecting to encounter the 
enemy. Jackson’s secrecy killed him and it was his men who would pay the price. 
General Franklin Paxton was unexpectedly thrust into command in the final engagements 
of the Battle o f Chancellorsville and the Stonewall Brigade suffered its highest number of 
casualties in any one engagement during the Civil War (“493 men, including the principal 
officers”8). Despite the valiant efforts of the brigade, it was the poor performance of 
Union forces (under the command of General Hooker) and the shortness o f the battle that 
saved the day. Afterwards, the Brigade could not even muster a full regiment.9
While secrecy was one important factor, Jackson’s stubborn personality and use 
of courts-martial proved to be another. The use of courts-martial was not unexpected due 
to his past but it did greatly reduce the effectiveness of his army. He attempted his first 
court-martial while at West Point and tried again against his commanding officer when 
he was stationed in Florida. While teaching at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), he 
tried to court-martial students on several occasions. When Jackson believed that 
someone had violated the rules and lost discipline, he strongly advocated that justice be 
rendered. As a military man, the tool Jackson most often used to enforce both discipline 
and justice was the court-martial.
It is a little known fact that within the six months spanning the Shenandoah 
Valley Campaign Jackson had attempted to court-martial two of his brigadier generals 
(Loring and Garnett) and two of his senior colonels (Conner and Gilham). Of his six 
divisional commanders, the only one not facing court-martial charges was General 
Alexander Lawton. Four of his senior officers had been provoked to the point of 
threatening to resign. While presenting these facts, the author Byron Farwell states that, 
“no other general, North or South, had shone himself so abrasive and so clumsy in his 
personal relations with subordinates, and he never improved.” 10 The cases involving 
Brigadier General Garnett and General A. P. Hill (divisional commander) were 
representative o f the circumstances surrounding many of these cases.
At the battle of Kernstown, General Garnett (commanding the Stonewall Brigade) 
ordered his men to retire at sundown, upsetting Jackson. According to Henry Douglas, a 
member of Jackson’s staff, “he maintained that he could not have held his position much 
longer... and that by falling back he saved some of his soldiers from unprofitable death 
and many from capture.” 1 The Confederate War Department agreed with Garnett and 
unsuccessfully attempted to convince Jackson to drop the charges. Garnett was even 
admonished for not breaking contact with the enemy sooner. Jackson’s own convictions
8 Robertson, 189.
5 Ibid.
10 Farwell, 332.
11 Douglas, 37.
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and unmovable position can be seen in his statement: “I regard Gen. Garnett as so 
incompetent as a brigade commander that, instead of building up a Brigade, a good one, 
if turned over to him, would actually deteriorate under his command.”12 The charges 
were eventually dropped after Jackson died, and Garnett spent the rest of his army career 
(he died during Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg) attempting to purge his loss of honor.
General A. P. Hill was first assigned to Jackson prior to the Cedar Mountain 
Campaign. He was considered one of the most skilled divisional commanders in the 
Confederate Army and as a result commanded the largest division. Lee sent along a 
recommendation stating that “you will, I think find [him] a good officer, with whom you 
can consult.”13 The addition of this skilled general proved problematic, however; the two 
men had been adversaries since West Point. Hill’s decision to delay beginning the march 
towards Maryland and then refusing the order to halt his column for a scheduled rest 
caused an argument that ended with Jackson placing Hill under arrest. The arrest was 
temporary because Jackson needed Hill, who later proved his worth as a commander at 
the battles of Sharpsburg and Boteler’s Ford. Throughout the campaign, however, a 
vicious battle of words ensued. Even the intervention of General Robert E. Lee could not 
end the feud and the threats of court-martial continued by both sides until Jackson’s 
death. Jackson had allowed an old rivalry and a small confrontation to arise into a large 
and time-consuming debate. It might not have had such an impact had it not occurred at 
the beginning and then during one of the Confederacy’s most critical military campaigns, 
the invasion of Maryland (what would be later called the First Invasion of Maryland).
Jackson’s inability to maintain a working relationship with subordinates and the 
harsh and strict way he treated his men led to much dissatisfaction. The only reason the 
majority who stayed did not transfer or resign was because they knew that Jackson won 
battles.
In order to see why Jackson was dubbed a military genius, his successes must be 
analyzed. Jackson entered the war and served through several campaigns beginning with 
the Shenandoah Valley Campaign and ending with the Battle of Chancellorsville. It is 
acknowledged by most historians that during the Seven Day Battle he showed poor 
leadership and was unable to plan and execute successful military tactics.14 But the 
successful military campaigns that resulted in him being dubbed a military genius were 
the Shenandoah campaign, the Battle of Fredericksburg, and his performance during the 
first part of the Battle o f Chancellorsville. The Union commanders faced during each of 
these successes were moderately talented commanders at best and inexperienced and 
untalented commanders at worst. The survival of Jackson’s reputation rests not on his 
success in battle but on his luck of not facing a capable commander (ex. Ulysees Grant, 
Tecumseh Sherman). During the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Jackson faced off 
against the Union Major Generals Nathaniel P. Banks and John C. Fremont. Both men 
were bested by Jackson during the campaign, yet neither was a capable military 
commander.
Nathaniel Banks was appointed the major general of volunteers in May of 1861 
and by July of the same year had been appointed the commander of the Department of the 
Shenandoah. He had no military experience and received his commission as a result of
12 Farwell, 240.
13 Ibid., 376.
14 Ibid, 333-71.
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political connections. His unsuccessful performance led to the capture of large quantities 
of Union supplies and the Confederate forces dubbing him “Commissary Banks.”15 After 
the Valley campaign, he continued to suffer defeats as part of the Union forces at Cedar 
Mountain, 2nd Manassas, and finally during the Red River Campaign of 1864. After 
these defeats, he was left without a command, and was eventually mustered out in August 
of 1865. His only notable contributions lay in his political contributions to the war effort. 
The notable fact about the battles between the two men was not that Jackson was usually 
the victor, but rather the frequency in which the victory was in doubt.16
John C. Fremont was a national hero as a result of his contribution to extracting 
California from Mexico during the Mexican War, but his performance during the Civil 
War proved to be less than adequate. As the first commander of the Department of the 
West, he suffered several significant losses and his involvement in the Battle of Wilson 
Creek in August of 1861 proved particularly disastrous. His subsequent decision to place 
Missouri under martial law resulted in Lincoln reassigning him to commander of the 
Mountain Department (Shenandoah Department). His failures continued and he 
eventually resigned after again being reassigned (he was placed under the command of 
Pope—a previous subordinate of his). Despite previous military experience and fame, 
Fremont was an inept commander. He saw his appointments strictly from a political 
standpoint, and it was his political connections that kept getting him prominent military 
appointments—not his skill.17
During the Battle of Fredericksburg, Jackson faced the Union general Ambrose 
Burnside. A reluctant commander who had twice refused the post o f commander of the 
Army of the Potomac, Burnside was inexperienced and knew it. Despite being a graduate 
of West Point (1847) and a veteran of both the Mexican War and fighting with Apaches 
in the New Mexico Territory, he was unprepared for the Civil War. Before 
Fredericksburg he had had limited success in expeditions that attacked the coast of North 
Carolina, but those were the last times he would perform well. His stubbornness and lack 
of experience cost the lives of many of the soldiers in his two corps at Anteitam.18 After 
the debacle at Fredericksburg, he experienced continued failure with his “Mud March” 
(which failed before it was even fully underway) and participation in the Siege of 
Knoxville, the Battle of the Wilderness, the Battle of Spotsylvania, and the Siege of 
Petersburg. Burnside’s poor military record and incompetence allows Jackson’s 
moderate performance to appear amazing in comparison.19
General Stonewall Jackson was a good general. He exhibited aggressiveness, 
personal courage, and sufficient detachment from his men to allow him to commit them 
to battle when necessary and without hesitation (unlike McClellan); however, he was not 
the extraordinary champion that history often says he is. The strong, secretive tendencies 
he had, the stubbornness that prompted him to constantly press court-martial charges on
15 Stewart Sifakis, “Nathaniel Prentiss Banks,” Who Was Who in the Civil War, (New York: Fact on File, 
1988).
16 Ibid.
17 Dick Weeks, "John Charles Fremont: 1813-1890," Civil War Biographies, 7 Jan. 1997,
<http://www.civilwarhome.com/biograph.htm>.
18 Clarence E. Macartney, Grant and His Generals (New York: McBride Company, 1953), 246.
Stewart Sifakis, “Ambrose E Burnside,” Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York: Fact on File, 1988).
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his subordinates, and the poor quality (militarily) of the commanders he faced in battle all 
serve to break down the stone wall surrounding Jackson’s reputation. Author Byron 
Farwell, in examining Jackson’s long-lasting reputation, states, “It was by dying...at the 
height of his career, that [Jackson] achieved... lasting fame.”20
20 Farwell, 532.
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